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Introduction
This article analyzes the history of  
Romanian nationalism’s transformation 
from ethnic consciousness to exclusive 
nationalism and places the four phases 
of  Romanian nationalism’s evolution 
and devolution within the theories 
of  nationalism put forth by Benedict 
Anderson and Ernest Gellner. Romanian 
nationalism developed over a period 
of  two hundred years, beginning in the 
middle of  the eighteenth century and 
culminating during World War II. It 
developed within four distinct phases: the 
birth of  Romanian ethnic consciousness, 
the appearance of  proto-nationalism, the 
era of  patriotic nationalism, and finally, 
the period of  exclusive nationalism. 
Each particular phase manifested within 
broad historical movements such as the 
Enlightenment, the Romantic Period, the 
Springtime of  Nations, and the Age of  
Nationalism. This article highlights some 
of  the key influences of  those historical 
periods upon Romanian nationalism. By 
aligning several of  the key features of  both 
Anderson and Gellner’s theories within 
the broad historical movements with 
Romanian nationalism’s development, it 
becomes clear that Romanian nationalism 
developed along a distinct course.
This article will first define key 
concepts such as nationalism, nation, 
ethnicity and modernization. Secondly, 
it briefly describes several of  the major 
tenets of  both Anderson and Gellner’s 
theories of  nationalism. Thirdly, it briefly 
outlines the historical situation of  each 
developmental phase of  Romanian 
nationalism, including the Romanian-
speaking region’s political, economic and 
sociological character. An explanation 
of  how the Romanian nation perceived 
both itself  and other ethnic groups defines 
and clarifies the monikers assigned the 
four phases. By illuminating Romanian 
perceptions and behaviors towards other 
ethnic groups, the article traces the 
beginnings of  Romanian xenophobia and 
intolerance that in the late nineteenth-
century were inextricably intertwined with 
Romanian conceptions of  national identity 
and how this conception collided with the 
process of  modernization in Romania and 
resulted in the Holocaust. 
Both Anderson’s Imagined Communities 
and Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism 
provide excellent, if  refutable, starting 
points for explaining how nationalism 
developed in Western European nations; 
indeed, Anderson’s theory of  imagined 
communities even includes nations in 
Asia, South America, North America and 
Western Europe. Their theories, however, 
do not adequately explain the phenomena 
of  Eastern European nationalism, and 
specifically, Romanian nationalism. 
And lastly, Gellner does offer a set of  
nationalism typologies, but Romania does 
not fit within them.
I argue that Romanian nationalism’s 
development falls largely outside of  
typologies and grand theories proposed 
by Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner. 
Instead of  attempting to categorize 
nationalisms in broad typologies, or even 
grouping them into several categories, 
it is more useful to think of  nationalisms 
developing in each nation differently, as 
each nation has its own complex history 
and unique set of  cultural and political 
challenges to contend with.   It is important 
to understand how nationalism develops 
because it has so often resulted in racism, 
xenophobia, exclusion and in the most 
extreme cases, genocide. In Romania’s 
case, understanding how nationalism 
developed can facilitate preventing its 
recurrence.  Contemporary Romanians 
can take steps to avoid  exclusive 
nationalism as it  becomes more prevalent 
during a time of  economic uncertainty 
and as Romanian society struggles to come 
to terms with its past, particularly with the 
role that it played in both the Holocaust 
and the Porajmos during World War II.
 
Theories and Principles of  
Nationalism
Whether it shows up in football matches 
between historic rivals such as Poland and 
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the levels predicted by Gellner. The fact is 
literacy in Romania remained quite low 
until after World War II; nevertheless, 
Romanian nationalism took root. Further, 
the cultural homogeneity that the state is 
supposed to engender did not happen in 
Romania, especially during the interwar 
years when debates about the nature of  
Romanian identity and the extent that 
modernization should take were most 
intense with nationalist,  xenophobic 
parties eventually taking over the reins of  
government in the years before World War 
II. And lastly, industrialization itself  and its 
corollary, urbanization, became the object 
of  fierce debate amongst the Peasantists, 
the Europeanists, and the eugenicists. 
The failures of  industrialization and 
urbanization, or at least the perception 
of  their failures, further fueled the racism 
inherent in Romanian nationalism 
and engendered ethnic scapegoating, 
especially vis-à-vis the Romanian Jewish 
population. These variables combined 
and transformed patriotic nationalism into 
genocidal nationalism. 
Complicating Anderson’s argument 
that print capitalism was the catalyst that 
spurred the emergence of  nationalism 
is the fact that virtually no printing in 
the Romanian language was done in the 
eighteenth-century in the Romanian-
speaking provinces, let alone print 
capitalism. Even during the nineteenth-
century the level of  printing was miniscule 
in comparison to other regions in Western 
Europe. Some of  this was due to the 
extremely low level of  literacy and the 
similar absence of  intellectual elites to 
promote the idea of  literacy through 
journals, newspapers and books. Also 
complicating the emergence of  print 
capitalism and literacy in the Romanian 
speaking regions was the fact that Romania 
was not an independent nation until 
1878. Permits to set up printing presses, 
which alarmed the community.7 It makes 
sense, then, to examine the historical roots 
of  Romanian nationalism and remind 
our contemporaries of  how murderous, 
nationalist ideologies emerge and potentially 
point a way towards reconciliation.
We can begin our investigation by 
asking several questions. What were the 
origins of  Romanian nationalism? How 
did Romanian nationalism transform from 
ethnic consciousness to exclusive, racist 
nationalism? How do the major theorists of  
nationalism explain the rise of  nationalism 
in Eastern European nations? How does 
Romanian nationalism fit within those 
theories? Why is it important to investigate 
the origins of  nationalism in Romania in 
particular? What has been the impact of  
Romanian nationalism upon minorities 
within Romanian borders? What is the 
nature of  Romanian nationalism? Is it 
xenophobic? Is it fueled by resentment, 
fear, or anxiety?
Several of  Gellner’s arguments for 
the rise of  nationalism are inappropriate 
in Romania’s case. The first problem 
is the vagueness with which he defines 
‘nationalism,’ itself  a movement that 
took place over the course of  nearly 
two centuries. In Romania nationalism 
can be broken down into four phases. 
Secondly, industrialism was not necessarily 
a principle cause of  nationalism in 
Romania because it developed unevenly 
in the Romanian-speaking regions and it 
developed quite late. The third point that 
is closely tied to the last is the fact that 
Romanian nationalism developed in the 
absence of  industrialism. This raises the 
fourth problem that, according to Gellner, 
industrialization requires the creation 
of  a homogeneous culture  by the state 
which includes the promotion of  mass 
literacy. Much like industrialization, mass 
literacy occurred unevenly throughout the 
regions and when it did, it was hardly at 
Russia,1 on the streets of  Budapest during 
a right-wing political demonstration,2 in 
the United States as white supremacists 
register to officially lobby the American 
government,3 or in Japan where right-
wing nationalists threatened to kill a 
South Korean actress if  she visited Japan,4 
nationalism and its corollary xenophobia 
still thrive. Romania is no exception, 
as evidenced by the sometimes popular 
Greater Romania Party (PRM).. Led by 
Corneliu Vadim Tudor (known also for his 
effusive praise of  the former Romanian 
dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu), the Greater 
Romania Party participated in the 
Romanian government for a brief  period 
from 1993-1995. In 2000, Tudor placed 
second behind Ion Iliescu, who became 
president that same year.5
Countless other examples abound 
of  nationalist parties on the rise across 
the Western Hemisphere. In Romania 
it seems that the  xenophobia connected 
with the Iron Guard of  interwar Romania 
and its role in the Holocaust have either 
been forgotten or sanitized and revised 
by Communist historians.6 Further 
complicating the mix of  xenophobia and 
nationalism in Romania is the legacy of  
the Treaty of  Trianon after World War 
I and the Romanian memory of  foreign 
domination for much of  its history. For 
Romanian Hungarians it is not uncommon 
for them to still reference Hungarian 
territorial losses after the Great War and 
long for the days when Transylvania 
was still part of  Hungary. Romanian 
Hungarians advocate strongly for their 
own institutions, such as universities, in 
which Hungarian is the primary language 
of  instruction. In Targu Mures, Romania, 
a city whose population is roughly half  
Hungarian and half  Romanian, fears of  
ethnic tensions are arising again due to 
the decision to allow the creation of  one 
Hungarian section at the medical school 
1. Colin Busby, “Euro 2012 Update: Nationalist Riots,” International Political Forum, June 13, 2012, http://internationalpoliticalforum.com/euro-2012-update-
nationalist-riots/.
2. Frank Bruni, “Bruni in Hungary: The Usual Scapegoats,” New York Times, April 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/24/opinion/bruni-in-hungary-the-
usual-scapegoats.html?_r=1&ref=hungary.
3. Nick Wing, “Paul Mullet, White Nationalist, Neo-Nazi Birther, Registers as Capitol Hill Lobbyist”, The Huffington Post, June 18, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2012/06/18/paul-mullet-white-nationalist-neo-nazi-lobbyist_n_1607179.html.
4. Yoo I Na, “Japanese Right-wing Nationalists Threaten if  Kim Tae Hee Comes to Japan ‘We’ll Kill Her,’” Soompi, March 12, 2012,  http://www.soompi.
com/2012/03/12/japanese-rightwing-nationalists-threaten-if-kim-tae-hee-comes-to-japan-well-kill-her/.
5. Balkan Insight, “Key Political Parties in Romania,” June 24 , 2012, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/who-is-who-political-parties-in-romania.
6.  Irina Livezeanu, “The Romanian Holocaust: Family Quarrels,” East European Politics and Societies, 16 (2002): 936.
7.   Michael Leidig, “Medical School in Hungarian Sparks Controversy, Fears Over Ethnic Divides” The Romanian Times, March 13, 2012, http://romaniantimes.at/
news/General_News/2012-03-13/20294/Medical_School_in_Hungarian_sparks_controversy,_fears_over_ethnic_divides_ . 
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due to a perceived threat to the existence 
of  a particular ethnic group’s cultural 
traditions. As a result, protection of  the 
nation is sought through the creation 
of  a state. According to John Breuilly, 
nationalist claims are “built upon three 
basic assertions: 1) There exists a nation 
with an explicit and peculiar character. 2) 
The interests and values of  this nation take 
priority over all other interests and values. 
3) The nation must be as independent 
as possible. This usually requires at least 
the attainment of  political sovereignty.”18 
Nationalism may also be broken down into 
typologies, which, for the purpose of  this 
paper, will be done as I attempt to define 
the four stages of  Romanian nationalism 
that I have identified. 
Gellner does not attempt to date 
the beginning of  modernization or the 
advent of  industrialization, which is 
problematic for explaining the appearance 
of  Romanian nationalism. For him, 
modernization merely implies that the 
rupture between agricultural societies and 
industrial societies has created a profound 
shift in human history. Depending upon 
the nation, this rupture may occur at 
various points in history, sometimes earlier, 
sometimes later. In the case of  the United 
States and Great Britain, it occurs roughly 
in the middle of  the eighteenth-century. 
Rationality becomes the rule, rather 
than a belief  in superstition or sacred 
knowledge.19  Formerly, the world was 
well-ordered and hierarchical. Religion 
provided a unified explanation of  the 
cosmos and the social order. The switch 
to rationality, though, turns this divinely 
ordered world upside down by offering 
unlimited exploration and questioning. 
Risk and uncertainty are introduced, but 
so is the notion of  progress.20
values are structurally implemented. 
Modernization as characterized by Maria 
Bucur is recognizable by “the growth of  
state institutions meant to subordinate 
local practices to a unitary system; the 
development of  modern political parties; 
the secularization of  political and social 
authority; industrialization; the growth of  
cities; and the development of  occupations 
tied to the new state institutions.”10 In the 
Romanian case, modernization would not 
begin until near the end of  the nineteenth-
century with the unification of  Moldovia 
and Wallachia as an independent nation11 
and gained speed with the formation of  
Greater Romania after World War I. 
According to Adrian Hastings, 
ethnicity is “a group of  people with 
a shared cultural identity and spoken 
language.”12 Hastings’ succinct definition 
of  ethnicity can be elaborated upon by 
using T.K. Oomen’s summary of  an 
ethnicity’s attributes: “religion, sect, caste, 
region, language, descent, race, colour 
and culture.”13 Nations are “cultural 
entities that tend to establish their own 
states”14 and denote self-awareness or self-
consciousness.15 Nations may or may not 
have political autonomy, and if  they do not 
have it officially, they invariably claim their 
right to it.  They almost always have their 
own literature, which becomes a primary 
source of  identification.16  
Lastly, nationalism attempts to unify 
the political and national units. Modern 
nationalism “overrides all other public 
obligations, and in extreme cases (such as 
war) all other obligations whatsoever.”17 
It can also refer to a political movement 
that seeks sovereignty within a certain 
geographical territory on behalf  of  a 
nation and uses nationalist arguments to 
justify its claim. Nationalism often arises 
therefore, were almost always denied by 
the imperialist power (Transylvania was 
dominated by the Austrian Empire and 
ethnic Hungarians until after World War I) 
due to the fear that nationalist ideas would 
indeed awaken the Romanian population 
to revolution. Even if  permission was 
granted, readership and subscription 
rates were so paltry that presses would 
quickly go out of  business. Nevertheless, 
Romanian nationalism did find a niche 
first in the Transylvanian intellectual 
circles in the eighteenth-century and even 
more fervently by the secular elites of  the 
Principalities of  Moldavia and Wallachia 
in the middle of  the nineteenth-century. 
In the Romanian speaking territories 
neither capitalism nor print existed on a 
large enough scale to promote the idea 
of  an “imagined community” across 
a wide geographical area, but instead, 
print capitalism and literacy remained 
confined to a small community of  elites 
and intellectuals. 
Before analyzing the evolution and 
devolution of  Romanian nationalism, 
it is necessary to define the terms that 
we will be dealing with. Gellner and 
Anderson’s proposals on the development 
of  nationalism are considered ‘modernist.’ 
According to Anthony D. Smith, the 
modernists assert that “nationalism, the 
ideology and movement is both recent 
and novel; nations too, are recent and 
novel; (and) both are the products of  
‘modernization’, the global movement 
of  societies to ‘modernity.’”8 Modernists 
attempt to track the creation of  nation-
states by following rates of  “urbanization, 
social mobility, rising literacy rates, media 
exposure and voting patterns.”9 Modernity 
implies reason, progress and rationality. 
Modernization is the process by which 
8.  Anthony D. Smith, Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism (New York: Rutledge, 2009), 6.
9.  Smith, Ethno-Symbolism, 4.
10. Maria Bucur, Eugenics and Modernization in Interwar Romania (Pittsburgh: University of  Pittsburgh Press, 2010) Kindle Edition.
11. Paul Blokker, “Modernity in Romania: Nineteenth Century Liberalism and its Discontents,” European University Institute, Florence. EUI Working Paper SPS   
 No. 2003/2. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/335/sps2003-02.pdf ?sequence=1. (Accessed June 2012).
12. Adrian Hastings, The Construction of  Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationhood (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 2.
13. Oomen, T. K., “State, Nation and Ethnie: The Processual Linkages,” in Race, Ethnicity and Nation: International Perspectives on Social Conflict, ed. Peter  
 Ratcliffe (London: University College of  London Press, 1994), 34.
14. Adrian Hastings, The Construction of  Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationhood, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 33.
15. Hastings, Nationhood,3.
16. Ibid., 4.
17. Ibid., 5.
18.  John Breuilly,  Nationalism and State, (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 1985), 3.
19.   Ernest Gellner, Plough Sword and Book: The Structure of  Human History. (London: Collins, 1988), 66.
20.   Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2006), 22.
83
VOLUME 16, 2012
defined borders receded and solidified. 
Regional and provincial governments 
began using local languages to administer 
the royal court. By the mid-seventeenth-
century, “the automatic legitimacy of  
sacral monarchy began its slow decline in 
Western Europe” and the rise of  modern 
nations began.31 
The final component of  Anderson’s 
conception of  modernity that significantly 
influenced the way man regarded the 
world was his new conception of  time. 
Medieval communities conceived time 
in terms of  ‘simultaneity.’  According to 
Anderson, “The medieval Christian mind 
had no conception of  history as an endless 
chain of  cause and effect or of  radical 
separations between past and present.” 
In other words, the past and future were 
fused in “an instantaneous present.”32 
History and cosmology were intertwined. 
Man’s interconnectedness with the world 
and his origins in relation to the world 
were validated by the sacred texts. As 
reason supplanted the power of  religion 
to give the universe meaning, conceptions 
of  time also changed. Rather than relying 
on faith to understand the seeming 
incomprehensibility and arbitrariness 
of  the universe, men now attempted to 
understand time as a series of  cause and 
effect. History became a sphere apart 
from the religious understanding of  the 
cosmos, inspiring man to view history 
both progressively and fatalistically. 
Religion no longer provided an adequate, 
comfortable explanation of  man’s place 
in the world, but at the same time, there 
was optimism that man could progressively 
alter his destiny.34 
 Proto-states and the nationalism 
they eventually engendered provided one 
means of  understanding man’s place on 
earth, though. With the shattering of  
Much like Gellner, Anderson describes 
a similar cultural rupture, occurring 
primarily in the eighteenth-century. In 
Anderson’s view, the eighteenth-century 
experienced the “dusk of  religious modes 
of  thought.”27 With the diminishing of  
religiosity, or the sacred, the “classical 
communities conceived of  themselves as 
cosmically central, through the medium 
of  a sacred language linked to a super-
terrestrial order of  power.”28 Communities 
were legitimated through religion. A 
sacred language, such as Latin, was also 
a privileged language. Only members 
of  the divinely sanctioned order (such as 
royalty, aristocracy, and the clerisy) had 
access to it. With the advent of  print 
capitalism and the publishing of  books 
in local languages, or vernaculars, the 
sacred languages lost both their legitimacy 
and power. In Anderson’s estimation, 
“The fall of  Latin exemplified a larger 
process in which the sacred communities 
integrated by the old sacred languages 
were gradually fragmented, pluralized 
and territorialized.”29 The church no 
longer could monopolize truth, especially 
as Europeans were mounting explorations 
in the New World, which had the effect 
of  broadening their cultural horizons and 
introducing them to new conceptions of  
human existence.30 
With the disintegration of  the sacred 
political order came the solidification of  
borders. Formerly, borders were porous, 
as the divinely sanctioned kingdom was 
centripetally ordered. Power emanated 
from the monarch, who acted as the center 
of  this hierarchically ordered universe. 
Entities such as the Holy Roman Empire, 
which had relied upon Latin as the thread 
and glue that held the Catholic territories 
together through language and religion, 
gradually disintegrated as vernacular-
Institutions that once controlled the 
economy, politics, religion and social roles 
are fractured. In an industrial society, 
the economy becomes an entity separate 
from politics, and religion is separated 
from politics; however, in Romania, the 
Orthodox Church played an essential 
role in propagating and supporting the 
extreme nationalist agenda during the 
interwar period. In Gellner’s ‘agro-literate 
societies,’ the peasants were cut off  from 
their aristocratic masters. This was not the 
case in Romania where the interests of  
the aristocracy held sway over those 
of  the peasantry until after World War I, 
when the first meaningful attempt at land 
reform was initiated.
 Rather than kinship, language 
and culture becomes the key feature of  
identity.21 Formerly, there was no chance 
for nationalism to develop between the 
spheres because the social strata were so 
starkly delineated, meaning that there was 
virtually no meaningful communication 
between the strata.22 Industrialism brings 
urbanization, which implies mobility, both 
literally and figuratively.23 Mass, secular 
education, taught in the local vernacular, 
fuels identity formation. As industrialism 
forced rural inhabitants to the cities, the 
newcomers found themselves in conflict 
with local minorities who speak different 
languages and have different cultural 
practices. They competed for scarce 
resources and in time, the minorities 
are excluded from the majority ethnic 
group.24 Eventually the ethnic majority 
“yearn(s) for incorporation into one of  
those cultural pools which already has, or 
looks as if  it might acquire, a state of  its 
own, with the subsequent promise of  full 
cultural citizenship.”25 Resentment fueled 
the desire for nationhood and the birth of  
nationalism was born.26 Nationalism, then, 
created nations.
21. Smith, Ethno-Symbolism, 5
22. John A. Hall and I.C. Jarvie, Transition to Modernity: Essays on Power, Wealth and Belief, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 122-124. 
23. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 62.
24. Smith, Ethno-Symbolism, 5.
25. Gellner, Plough Sword and Book, 210.
26. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 129.
27. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, (London: Verso, 1983), 11.
28. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 13.
29. Ibid.,19.
30. Ibid.,16.
31. Ibid., 21.
32. Ibid., 23.
33. Ibid., 24.
34. Ibid., 12.
84
GVSU McNair Scholars Journal
eastward looking Province were unlike 
those found anywhere in Europe.”42 
Transylvania’s distance from Vienna 
and the devastation of  the countryside 
due to continual foreign invasion and 
Ottoman oppression and Greek Phanariot 
exploitation led the Hapsburgs to conclude 
that the capacity for unrest, which could 
potentially spread to its other eastern 
holdings, particularly Serbia and Hungary, 
needed to be immediately addressed.43 
The first potentially destabilizing force 
that needed to be rectified was the virtual 
autonomy that the Three Nations44 
(the German Saxons, Hungarians and 
Szeklers) had enjoyed for centuries under 
the Hungarians and later, Ottoman rule. 
The Romanians, on the other hand, were 
not a recognized nation, but rather, were 
merely ‘tolerated.’  Romanian nobles had 
been largely absorbed into the Magyar 
aristocracy.  Even though it did not enjoy 
official recognition and was itself  in danger 
of  obsolescence, the Orthodox Church had 
become the de facto representative of  the 
Transylvanian Romanians simply because 
it was the only legitimate Romanian 
institution in Transylvania with some form 
of  administrative structure, no matter how 
feeble it might have been.  Further, Austrian 
Roman Catholics viewed the truce between 
the four ‘received’45 religions (Calvinists, 
Unitarians, Catholics, and Lutherans) and 
the Orthodox Church in Transylvania as 
heretical, thus adding a cultural element to 
political consolidation.46 By using religion 
as a wedge, the Austrians hoped to resolve 
the inherent instability of  Transylvania 
and quicken centralization.47  
Of  most consequence to the Romanian 
Transylvanian’s conception of  ethnic 
consciousness was Leopold’s forced union 
of  the Roman Catholic Church with that 
of  the Romanian Orthodox.48 Leopold 
century in Transylvania. The next phase 
can be defined as ‘proto-nationalism’ 
in which elites created a community 
based on a common vernacular, in this 
case Romanian, located in a particular 
geographical area and “can be a sort of  
pilot project for the as yet non-existent 
larger intercommunicating community.”38 
The Romanian proto-nationalists were 
first represented by the Uniate Orthodox 
members of  the Transylvanian School in 
the late eighteenth century.39  
The slow dissolution of  the Ottoman 
Empire near the end of  the seventeenth-
century and its defeat at the hands of  
the Austrians in 1684 provided space for 
Romanians to advocate for both political 
legitimacy and to define Romanian identity. 
After the Ottoman’s failed siege of  Vienna, 
Transylvania fell under the domination 
of  the Hapsburgs. Almost immediately 
the ideals of  the Enlightenment began 
filtering into Transylvania via Romanian 
Uniate priests who, due to their new status 
as Hapsburg subjects, were granted the 
privilege to pursue university educations 
in both Transylvania and abroad.40 Under 
the Ottomans, Romanians had virtually 
no access to even the most rudimentary 
education, let alone one from a university. 
This changed under the Austrians as 
a result of  the union of  the Romanian 
Orthodox church with the Roman 
Catholic Church, which was the religion 
of  the Austrian court.41 
    Transylvania was ceded to Austria 
by the Ottomans in 1699 with the signing 
of  the Treaty of  Carlovitz. King Leopold 
immediately set to work consolidating 
and incorporating Transylvania into the 
Austrian realm. In some ways, Transylvania 
seemed a natural fit for Western integration, 
but “the physical and geographical 
features of  the isolated, independent, and 
simultaneous conceptions of  time, man’s 
need to understand the continuity of  
his existence (birth, adulthood, death, 
the afterlife) was undercut. The state, 
with its manufactured roots of  historical 
legitimacy, came to be seen as an organism 
that had existed for millennia and would 
continue to exist far into the future. By 
identifying with the nation, man imagined 
himself  as connected to an entity that 
moved along calendrical time. His 
existence was “measured by clock and 
calendar.”35 According to Anderson, the 
print capitalism of  the sixteenth-century 
allowed man to imagine himself  as 
connected with others who spoke and read 
the same language and practiced the same 
cultural traditions. This connectedness 
was represented by the date printed on 
newspapers and broadsheets. When 
reading a dated publication, readers could 
imagine themselves connected to similar 
readers from far-away places. The reader 
may never meet his compatriots, but he 
was aware that they were reading the same 
publication, possibly at the same time, 
within a general geographical location.36 
Along with the advent of  capitalism, 
increasing literacy propelled the creation 
of  a middle class, an essential component 
of  modern nations and the audience that 
would be most influential in subscribing 
to nationalist ideologies during the Age of  
Nationalism in the twentieth-century. 37
Romanian Ethnic Consciousness 
and Its Historical Foundations
The initial step in the development 
of  Romanian nationalism can be viewed 
as one in which Romanian ethnic 
consciousness was first articulated in the 
work and advocacy of  Ion Inochentie 
Klein during the middle of  the eighteenth-
35. Ibid., 24.
36. Ibid., 36,37.
37. Smith, Ethno-Symbolism, 6
38. Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, (Cambridge University Press: New York, 1990), 59, 60.
39. Keith Hitchins, Studies on Romanian National Consciousness, (Pelham: Nagard, 2006), 29.
40. Keith Hitchins, The Idea of  Nation: The Romanians of  Transylvanian, 1691-1849, (Bucharest: Editura Ştiinţifică, 1988), 11.
41. Hitchins, National Consciousness, 7.
42. Paul Shore,  Jesuits and the Politics of  Religious Pluralism in Eighteenth-Century Transylvania, 1693-1773, (Ashgate: Hampshire, 2007), 42.
43. Shore, Jesuits, 39.
44. The Three Nations were the “received” or officially recognized nations of  Transylvania. This recognized status dated back to the fifteenth century and had  
 remained in place despite the fact that the Romanians occupied the majority of  the Transylvanian population.
45. As official religions, the “received” religions were supported by the Transylvania government and were eligible for both financial and political support.
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argued that the Romanian nation had 
occupied Transylvania the longest, and 
therefore, deserved equality with the three 
received nations. He was the first to attempt 
to establish the nobility of  the Romanians 
and their historical legitimacy as a people 
who belonged to Western Civilization; 
therefore, they deserved the same political 
rights of  the Three Nations. 55 He was 
also the first to argue that Romanians 
deserved equal representation due to the 
fact that they represented a majority of  
the population in Transylvania, paid a 
majority of  the taxes and contributed the 
most men to the military. Lastly, he argued 
that the Leopoldine Diplomas guaranteed 
public office for Romanians who had 
converted to the Uniate Church. None 
of  his protestations, either to Vienna or 
Cluj, bore fruit.56   
Klein was a product of  the Orthodox 
countryside and shared a traditional 
worldview with Romanian-speakers that 
had changed little over the centuries. For 
Klein, to be Romanian was to be Romanian 
Orthodox. Romanian Orthodox was 
not strictly based on doctrine but was 
also intertwined with culture, a culture 
with which Klein was unreservedly and 
passionately aligned and dedicated to 
preserving.57 Further, because Romanian 
Transylvanians were under the yoke of  
the Austrians, Hungarians and Saxons, 
there was little hatred directed towards 
“the Other,” which would characterize 
Romanian nationalism in the late 
nineteenth-century.58 Klein’s association 
with the traditional, folk customs of  
Orthodox Romanians in Transylvania 
went far to create a sense of  solidarity and 
ethnic consciousness.59 
Through Klein’s leadership and 
the educational opportunities made 
available through Jesuit institutions and 
other opportunities to study in foreign 
probably the most important Romanian 
figure in the first half  of  the eighteenth-
century who contributed to the awakening 
of  Romanian ethnic consciousness. Klein 
viewed the Uniate Church first as a 
vehicle to achieve political rights for the 
Romanian clergy, and second, as a means 
of  attaining the same political equality 
of  the Romanian nation with that of  
the Three Nations. His emphasis on the 
natural law and the “equality of  rights 
between nations” sets him apart as the 
“path-finder of  the Romanians’ national 
struggle.”52 Thirty years after the Union 
of  1700, Uniate priests still had not been 
awarded the equality promised by the 
Second Leopoldine Diploma. Klein fought 
vigorously, both at the Court in Vienna and 
at the Transylvanian Diet in Cluj, for the 
realization of  those rights. Klein interpreted 
the Second Diploma as conferring equality 
not only upon Uniate priests, but also 
upon all Romanians in Transylvania. He 
conceived of  all Romanians as a distinct 
nation, a grouping superior to both the 
Roman Catholic Church and the Uniate 
Church that deserved to have an equal 
political status as the Three Nations. Klein 
was less concerned with the conversion 
of  Romanians to the Uniate Church, 
than to an overall improvement in the 
social, economic and educational status 
of  the peasantry and all Transylvanian 
Romanians in general.53   
It was within this context of  solidarity 
that Klein began to formulate the basis 
of  Romanian historical legitimacy via 
relentless petitioning to the Transylvanian 
Diet and the Austrian Court.54 As Klein 
resisted the Jesuit’s attempts to subordinate 
the Uniate Church to their authority, 
he weaved the idea of  Daco-Romanian 
continuity into his arguments for 
Romanian political equality. By claiming 
Daco-Roman descent, he essentially 
viewed the Uniate Church as a vehicle 
to achieve both political pacification 
and recatholicization of  Transylvanian 
society. He had no intention of  allowing 
the formation of  an autonomous 
Uniate Church. The merging of  the 
Romanian Orthodox Church with Roman 
Catholicism was enshrined in the Act of  
Union, which also served as the official 
end of  the Romanian Orthodox Church 
in Transylvania.  The Union had the effect 
of  dividing Romanians into two religious 
groups. On the one hand, this had a 
divisive effect, but on the other, it caused 
Romanians to begin looking at themselves 
and asking questions about what it meant to 
be Romanian. Even though it was deprived 
of  an administrative structure, it would, 
nevertheless, continue to subsist through 
sheer stubbornness and with support from 
neighboring Orthodox communities.49  
As a final act of  the Union, the rights 
previously granted to the Uniate clergy in 
1692 (the same rights as Catholic priests, 
immunity from taxation, payment of  
the tithe and other burdens imposed by 
landlords) were reaffirmed by Austrian 
officials at Alba Iulia on September 5, 
1700 and adopted by the Orthodox 
Metropolitans Teofil and Athanasie.50 
Romanian Uniate priests and those who 
converted to the Uniate Church believed 
that they had finally achieved the same 
equality and status shared by the four 
recognized confessions. It is doubtful as 
to whether the Monarchy ever intended 
to actually fully enforce the Uniate 
clergy’s newly enshrined political rights, 
but Uniate membership, nevertheless, 
opened other doors of  opportunity, 
especially in education and representation 
at the Austrian court.51 
Ion Inochentie Klein, the Jesuit-
educated and Uniate Bishop of  
Transylvania from 1729-1751, was 
48. Ibid., 48.
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56. Keith Hitchins, The Idea of  Nation: The Romanians of  Transylvania, 1691-1849, (Bucharest: Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1988), 45-48.
57. Hitchins, National Consciousness, 12.
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social problems and were unreservedly 
optimistic that the misery and poverty 
of  all Romanian-speaking peoples 
could be alleviated through pragmatic 
measures. Focused less on philosophical 
problems, they meditated on the practical 
problems of  Transylvania: the condition 
of  the peasantry, education, and 
political autonomy. 65 
The Transylvanian School existed 
from roughly 1785-1815. Its most notable 
members, Samuil Micu-Klein, Gheorghe 
Şincai, Petru Maior and Ion Budai-Deleanu, 
were all preoccupied with expanding and 
refining the ideas of  Romanian historical 
continuity begun by Ion Innochentie 
Klein. They believed that by illustrating 
the Romanians’ fundamental Latinity, they 
would gain historical legitimacy, entrance 
into Western civilization, and would win 
access to civil and human rights.66 Samuil 
Micu-Klein was the first to politicize the 
theory of  Roman continuity. Written in 
1791 “The History of  the Romanians in 
Questions and Answers” during a period 
of  political unrest across Europe, some 
historians surmise that this book aimed 
to upset and attack the legitimacy of  the 
Three Nations.67 
In contrast to Ion Innochentie Klein, 
who believed that the Romanian language 
was inadequate for legal and political 
expression and who preferred to use Latin, 
members of  the Transylvanian School 
began exploring the etymological roots of  
the Romanian. To them, the Romanian 
language had become corrupted by Slavic, 
Hungarian and German words and had 
been further obscured by the Cyrillic 
alphabet. The Romanian language, he 
believed, had not developed as fully as 
other Western languages because of  
the continuous barbarian invasions and 
extensive periods of  foreign domination. 
He and his colleagues believed that it 
was their duty to restore the language 
to its original Latin roots.68 Underlying 
the restoration of  the language was the 
contends,62 we can begin with eighteenth-
century Romanian conception of  the 
Jews. For the most part, Jews were not the 
objects of  exclusion during Ion Klein’s 
tenure as Bishop of  Transylvania, as 
much as they were the objects of  aversion. 
Owing to still extant Medieval perceptions 
of  Jews, Romanians thought of  them in 
stereotypical, hateful terms. For example, 
racist terms such as the “Jew as Usurer” 
and ‘Christ-killer’ became common 
descriptions for Jewish people. The stereo-
type of  the ‘Wandering Jew’ who was 
said to be doomed to wander the earth 
because he had ceased to do the will of  
God and had thus fallen out of  His favor 
was also prevalent but would take on a 
more significant meaning in the middle of  
the nineteenth-century when Romanian 
anti-Semitism, and xenophobia in general, 
became more complex, pervasive, deep-
seeded and Romanian-specific.63 
The Transylvanian School and 
Proto-Nationalism
The Orthodox Church  continued to 
exist in a position of  resistance for several 
more decades until Leopold’s daughter, 
Empress Maria Theresa, was forced to 
admit the failure of  the Austrian Uniate 
policy in 1759 and allowed the Orthodox 
to have their own metropolitan, albeit a 
Serbian one.64 By this time, a small group 
of  Transylvanian intellectuals, largely 
educated at the Jesuit-run gymnasium at 
Cluj, expanded upon the ideas of  Ion 
Inochentie Klein and elevated the position 
of  ethnic consciousness to one of  proto-
nationalism. This group of  distinguished 
intellectuals, made up primarily of  priests 
with a smattering of  laymen and boyars, 
came to be known as “The Transylvanian 
School,” and was led by Ion Inochentie 
Klein’s nephew, Samuil Micu-Klein, who 
was also a Uniate Priest.  Because many 
of  them had been educated in Austrian 
or Western universities, they were highly 
receptive to the use of  reason to solve 
universities, a tiny Romanian intellectual 
class developed. While it did not have 
the needed political weight to successfully 
defend its perceived rights that had been 
granted by the Act of  Union, this small 
group, comprised primarily of  Uniate 
Priests, did represent both the germ of  
discontent and the presence of  ethnic 
consciousness, the precursor to full- 
blown nationalism.60   
Discontent in the Transylvanian 
countryside added impetus to Klein’s 
efforts to build the foundations of  
Romanian ethnic consciousness. In the 
middle of  the eighteenth-century, foreign 
‘prophets’ such as Sarai Visarion, a 
Serbian Orthodox Monk, preached across 
the Transylvania countryside against the 
Union and warned of  souls being damned 
because Romanians had been unwittingly 
tricked by Uniate priests into believing 
that Uniate theology was no different than 
Orthodox doctrine. This provoked what 
Hitchins calls the ‘village intellectuals’ 
to petition the court in Vienna for equal 
representation and religious freedom 
for Romanians in Transylvania. Village 
intellectuals were largely reacting to what 
they viewed as a potentially apocalyptic 
event: the destruction of  the Romanian 
Orthodox Church. Despite the flurry 
of  political organization that was first 
manifested in mid-eighteenth-century 
Transylvania, it must be kept in mind that 
this was done outside of  any irredentist 
desire for Romanian statehood, but rather, 
within the confines of  Habsburg law. 
There was no social revolution, but theirs 
was the desire for religious freedom.61   
Because Romanian ethnic 
consciousness eventually transformed 
into an exclusivist nationalism strongly 
associated with xenophobia in the late 
nineteenth-century, it is useful to consider 
at this point the way in which Romanians 
conceived of  their Jewish neighbors. If  
anti-Semitism is a useful indicator of  
xenophobia in general as Sorin Mitu 
60. Vladimir Hanga, “The Legal Arguments of  the Romanian Claims in the Supplex Libellus Valachorum, L’Europe du Sud-Ost 3, (1976):142
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revolutionary spirit that was spreading 
like wildfire in France would overtake the 
Austrian realms. He moved quickly to 
rescind his predecessor’s reforms. In this 
regard he was successful, but the Supplex 
revealed that Romanian thinking about 
their nation had become more complex. 
Even though the influence of  Romanian 
Transylvanian elites would recede and give 
way to elites in Moldavia and Wallachia, 
the influence of  the Supplex would be felt 
throughout the nineteenth-century.74 
The Supplex essentially unifies the 
political program put forth by Ion Klein 
during his time as Bishop of  the Uniate 
Church in Transylvania. The only 
difference is its superior organization and 
vastness.75 The Enlightenment concepts 
and principles contained within it (natural 
law, social contract, the rights of  man) 
illustrate well the extent of  the penetration 
of  Western ideas into thinking and 
writings of  the isolated and marginalized 
Romanian elite class.76 Implicit within it 
also is the Enlightenment’s attitude towards 
history: “History is merely a depository 
of  all the injustices that must never occur 
again…He (the Aufklärer) sees in the past 
only inferiority, backwardness. For him, 
the Middle Ages represent only darkness, 
ignorance, superstition, slavery and lack of  
useful culture.”77 A recurring theme among 
many Romanian scholars and aristocrats 
near the end of  the nineteenth century was 
the awareness of  the Romanian-speaking 
land’s pervasive backwardness. The Supplex 
acknowledges this state as it describes the 
historical injustices perpetrated against the 
Romanian nation in Transylvania vis-à-
vis its disenfranchisement and demotion 
from historical ally and partner of  the 
Hungarian nation to subordinate, tolerated 
status without political or cultural rights.78 
The Supplex puts forth the argument that 
Romania is not demanding new rights, 
but rather, the “restitution of  old ones.”79 
The Orthodox Church was given the 
authority to open schools, procure dual-
language books (German-Romania) and 
ensure that enrollment opportunities were 
being maximized.71 State support for the 
Orthodox schools became mandatory.
Joseph II implemented o other 
reforms that seriously undermined the 
political structure of  Transylvania that had 
been dominated for centuries by the Saxon 
and Hungarian nobilities. First, Joseph 
guaranteed the free practice of  Orthodoxy 
and made illegal discrimination against 
its adherents. Romanian Orthodoxy thus 
was no longer a ‘tolerated’ religion but a 
‘received’ one placed on equal footing with 
the four received religions of  the three 
nations. Secondly, he abolished the old 
Hungarian and Saxon system of  counties 
and replaced it with one that paid little heed 
to the ethnic makeup of  the former regions. 
The result was that the new counties 
had a more natural ethnic and religious 
makeup. In effect, all four nationalities 
were placed on an equal political footing 
and were guaranteed equal representation 
before the Austrian court.72 Unfortunately, 
resistance to the new cultural and political 
reforms from the Saxons and Hungarians 
was especially fierce and eventually led 
to Joseph repealing most of  the reforms 
before his death in 1790. Nevertheless, his 
recognition of  the Orthodox Church and 
his implementation of  education reform 
strengthened the resolve and drive of  the 
Romanian nation so seek political equality.
The most significant political 
document written by Romanians in the 
eighteenth-century came about as a 
direct result of  Joseph II’s reforms and 
his death. The Supplex Libellus Vallachorum73 
was written one year after his death as 
Romanians realized that the window of  
opportunity for gaining political equality 
in Transylvania was closing fast. His 
successor, Leopold II, feared that the 
recognition that the Romanian people 
had fallen far behind the rest of  Western 
Europe. The Transylvania School thus 
represented the first attempts to rectify 
the backwardness of  their countrymen 
and region.69
The role of  Joseph II, the Austrian 
Monarch, was also a significant factor in 
creating space for Romanian intellectuals 
to conceive of  themselves as a nation 
within Transylvania worthy of  political 
legitimacy. Joseph II was interested in 
continuing the process of  centralization 
in the Austrian provinces, using reason to 
create more efficient governing structures 
throughout the realm and in making the 
provinces more useful, efficient and just. 
He believed passionately in promoting 
education at all levels of  society. After 
visiting Transylvania and engaging the 
Romanian population in 1773, 1783, and 
1786, he became personally interested in 
the plight of  the peasants who had been for 
centuries mired in poverty and ignorance. 
After Horea’s peasant uprising in 1784, 
Joseph II’s resolve to address the plight of  
the Romanian nation in Transylvania was 
hardened. Although he ruthlessly stamped 
out the rebellion, he did recognize that 
reforms needed to be implemented in the 
countryside if  further uprisings were to be 
avoided. This resulted in the emancipation 
of  the Transylvanian serfs in 1785. 
As a direct result of  Horea’s uprising, 
Joseph II’s commitment to education 
specifically addressed the goal of  “raising 
the Romanian nation out of  poverty and 
ignorance to a place of  equality with the 
other nations of  Transylvania.”70 While it 
was true that Joseph II’s goal of  providing 
an education for the impoverished 
minorities of  Transylvania was a noble 
one, his policy was also pragmatic in the 
sense the he sought to use education to 
both pacify the region and to maximize 
the economic potential of  the region. 
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Nearly twenty-five years before the 
Russian takeover of  the Principalities, the 
idea of  a politically unified Romanian 
territory had been discussed in the Russian 
diplomatic and intellectual circles. Various 
proposals were put forth and tabled, none 
of  them conceived by ethnic Romanians, 
but all of  them with the goal of  eliminating 
the principalities and the potential for 
the political and cultural unification of  
a Romanian state.85 In 1803 the Russian 
diplomat, Vasili Feodorovich Malinowski, 
was the first to put forth the idea of  a united 
Romanian-speaking territory which would 
be dominated by varying degrees under 
either Austria or Russia. Malinowski was 
a well-known liberal in Russian elite circles 
and was also a passionate advocate of  the 
natural rights of  man and hence, nations. 
Since the inhabitants of  Transylvania 
were primarily Romanian, Malinowski 
proposed that Austria cede Transylvania 
and unite with Moldavia and Wallachia to 
form the new ‘Kingdom of  the Dacians.’ 
Despite the seemingly benign intentions of  
Russia vis-à-vis their Romanian Orthodox 
brothers, the goal of  a unified Dacia 
seems to have been one of  political and 
economic dominance, rather than support 
for national self-determination.86 
By 1828 Russian policy in the 
Principalities seemed to be gaining 
purchase, even if  it was somewhat 
ambivalent. On one hand, there had 
been previous talk of  breaking apart the 
Principalities, but on the other hand, 
Kiselev, and to some degree his Ottoman 
co-administrators, imposed the Réglement 
Organique upon the Principalities. The 
Réglement Organique was a quasi-democratic 
regime in the sense that its members were 
elected, but those representatives were 
chosen solely from the boyars, or Romanian 
aristocratic class. The peasantry was 
excluded. The significance of  the 
Réglements to this article is threefold. First, 
they eventually functioned as the basis 
for the unification of  a semi-autonomous 
Moldavian and Wallachian government 
and were even essential as intermediaries.80 
As a politically disenfranchised people, 
Romanian-speakers in Transylvania 
focused their energies first on political 
emancipation from the Austrian and 
Hungarian aristocracy. Romanian anti-
Semitism did not become more exclusive 
until the legislation of  the Organic Law 
from 1835-1859 was implemented.81  
After the failed Greek uprising in 1821 
the Phanariot princes were expelled from 
Moldavia and Wallachia and replaced with 
Romanian born princes by the Ottoman 
Porte. Russia restrained herself  from 
interfering too obviously in Romanian 
internal affairs, but nevertheless awaited 
the chance to supplant Ottoman rule. This 
chance came in the mid-1820’s as Great 
Britain’s foreign policy focused less on 
supporting the Romanian-speaking lands 
as a buffer region between the Austrian 
and Ottoman Empires.82 By 1828 Turkish 
power was clearly on the decline and Turkey 
could no longer hold on to Moldavia and 
Wallachia.83 Russia, the self-declared 
protector of  its Orthodox brethren in 
Romania, attacked Turkey and forced it 
to concede its influence in its Romanian-
speaking holdings. Count Kiselev was 
installed as overseer of  the Principalities 
by Tsar Alexander and a constitution was 
quickly composed and imposed on the 
chaotic, downtrodden Principalities. While 
the initial years of  Russian domination saw 
an increase in pillaging and murder in the 
Principalities, this exploitation was soon 
quelled by Kiselev, himself  an Aufklärer who 
had high-minded principles about how 
the Principalities should be governed.84 
In the span of  less than ten years, the 
Principalities had been freed of  the 
extortionist Phanariot regime, witnessed 
the diminished control of  the Ottomans 
(although the Ottomans nominally still 
held some influence in the Principalities, 
the Principalities were essentially under 
the subjugation of  the Russians) and 
succumbed to the “protection” of  its 
Orthodox Russian brothers. 
Only redress in the present can rectify the 
backwardness of  Romanians and bring 
them into the enlightened epoch.
Unfortunately for the Romanian 
political cause, the Austrian Monarchy 
had grown increasingly alarmed at both 
the upheaval that was taking place in 
revolutionary France and at the awareness 
that similar conflict could easily extend 
to its realms. Joseph II’s reforms were 
rescinded and the Romanian’s political 
demands were ignored. The demands 
of  the Romanian elites for political 
representation proportionate to their 
population and tax burden would 
fundamentally alter the power structure 
of  Transylvania if  recognized. Revolution 
would ensue. Romanian requests to install 
printing presses were rejected, the use of  
German as the administrative language 
was reinforced and the historic status of  
the Romanian political status as ‘tolerated’ 
was reconfirmed. At the turn of  the 
nineteenth-century, the political activity 
of  the Romanian clergy was suppressed 
until after World War I when Transylvania 
was incorporated into the new Romanian 
state. The onus of  political activity pivoted 
to Moldavia and Wallachia, where the 
tone became more secular as the political 
struggle was picked up by intellectuals 
operating outside of  the Romanian 
Orthodox Church.
Noticeably absent from the first phase 
of  Romanian nationalism’s development 
in Transylvania was the exclusion of  Jews 
or other non-ethnic elements. Members of  
the Romanian Orthodox Church and the 
Romanian nation had always viewed those 
who did not subscribe to their religious 
creeds or cultural traditions as outsiders; 
nevertheless, Jews, especially in Moldavia, 
were engaged in professions such as money-
lending and tavern-keeping, professions 
that were traditionally not taken up by 
Romanians. The stance Romanians took 
towards Jews was what one historian 
labeled “hostilely tolerant,” but Jews were 
not explicitly excluded from commerce 
79. Ibid.,  420.  
80. Ladislau Gyemant, “The Romanian Jewry: Historical Destiny, Tolerance, Integration, Marginalisation,” Journal for the Study of  Religious Ideologies, 3(2002), 85.
81. Fischer-Galati, Stephen, “The Legacy of  Anti-Semitism,” In The Tragedy of  Romanian Jewry, ed. Randolph L. Braham, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 5.
82. R.W. Seton-Watson, A History of  the Roumanians: From Roman Times to the Completion of  Unity, (London: Archon Books, 1963), 202-205.
83. Moldavia and Wallachia will henceforth be referred to as “the Principalities.”
84. Seton-Watson, A History of  the Roumanians, 203-206.
85. Alex Drace Francis, The Making of  Modern Romanian Culture: Literature and the Development of  National Identity, (New York: Taurus Academic Studies, 2006), 23.
86. Francis, Romanian Culture, 24.
89
VOLUME 16, 2012
adequate infrastructure, there was little 
reason to invest in the kind of  heavy 
industry that had been introduced in 
Great Britain and the United States nearly 
one hundred years earlier. Romanian 
nationalism, though, was clearly 
evident, despite Gellner’s insistence that 
industrialism come first.
Also salient to this period was the rise 
of  literacy and publishing, both of  which 
Anderson claimed would need to be in 
place in order for a nation to be “imagined.” 
Due to the scarcity of  statistics concerning 
the Romanian-speaking regions during 
this period in virtually every demographic 
category, it is nearly impossible to form a 
completely accurate assessment of  literacy 
and readership in the region; however, 
drawing on circumstantial documentation, 
the historian can safely surmise that 
Romanians were one of  the least literate 
peoples in Europe in the nineteenth-
century. One observer during this period 
claimed that Romanian literacy was at 
8%, while another believed that even this 
number was too high. One work of  official 
propaganda dating from the beginning of  
the twentieth-century placed Romanian 
illiteracy at 87%, or roughly the same 
levels found in some regions of  sixteenth-
century Western Europe; therefore, it is 
safe to assume that literacy levels were 
much lower seventy-five years earlier.94  
Despite these extremely low levels 
of  literacy, prominent members of  the 
intelligentsia and Romanian political elite 
still believed in the essential importance of  
fostering Romanian national consciousness 
through newspapers and magazines. Most 
notably was Gheorghe Asachi of  Moldavia, 
editor of  Albina româneascaâ (The Romanian 
Bee, 1829-1847), who described literature 
as “the practical method of  cultivating 
the nation.”95 Asachi’s counterpart in 
Wallachia, Ion Heliade Rădalescu, 
published Curiel rumânesc (The Romanian 
period, as it insisted on every nation’s right 
to national self-determination. The means 
for nations to rid themselves of  foreign 
oppression was through revolutionary 
upheaval. And lastly, with its insistence 
that every nation is unique (having its 
own language, history and culture), 
Romanticism played a key role in providing 
the vocabulary and direction for Romanian 
patriots in their quest for autonomy.90  
According to Gellner, nationalism 
does not arise until the appearance 
of  industrialization; however, when 
considering the rise of  Romanian 
nationalism during the middle of  the 
nineteenth-century in the Principalities, it is 
important to note that industrialization was 
still a long way off. The Romanian economy 
at this time was essentially mercantilist. 
The Romanian region of  the Danubian 
basin became the breadbasket and cattle 
producer for the imperialist regimes in 
Vienna, Constantinople and St. Petersburg. 
A significant portion of  the merchant 
class was of  foreign origin and had little 
reason to invest in the infrastructure that 
would facilitate the efficient transportation 
of  Romania agricultural products and 
provide incentives to Romanian peasants 
to produce more. Further, because of  the 
Principalities long tradition of  political 
instability and arbitrary system of  
taxation, there was little appetite to invest 
in long-term transportation projects such 
as bridges and highways.91 Nevertheless, 
there was still often a grain or cereal 
surplus that could not be sold abroad for 
lack of  efficient transportation. Whiskey 
was often produced as a means of  realizing 
some profit on the grain surplus, which 
in turn lead to overproduction of  liquor 
in general, leading one diarist to lament 
that the lack of  efficient roads actually 
lead Romanians to a state of  dissipation.92 
Serious investment in infrastructure would 
not occur until the 1860’s93 and without 
in 1859 and became the vehicle by which 
political autonomy was reached. Second, 
for the first time in Romanian history, they 
created space for a Romanian opposition 
party to form, which was primarily 
dissatisfied with the Romanian status of  
Russian protectorate and administrator. 
This opposition was mostly composed 
of  boyars who had been educated in 
the West and returned to Romania 
with revolutionary and Enlightenment 
ideals that guided them in their quest 
for Romanian independence. Lastly, for 
the first time legislation was enacted that 
expressly forbid Jews from owning land 
and gaining Romanian citizenship.87 
It would seem then, that if  Russia had 
planned on using the Réglements as a tool 
to exert influence upon the Principalities, 
this plan had unwittingly unleashed a 
patriotic, nationalist fervor that would only 
accelerate over the course of  the next 
one hundred years.
With Romanian patriots in 
Transylvania effectively silenced by the 
rise of  the Magyars in that region, the 
nationalist intelligentsia in the Principalities 
capably took up the cause for Romanian 
sovereignty. This was partly accomplished 
by a marked rise in literacy in the boyar88 
class and also by the introduction of  new 
printing presses, which was a direct result 
of  Romanian elites going abroad to receive 
educations firmly rooted in Enlightenment 
rationalism. This meant that the next 
phase of  Romanian nationalism, what 
I call patriotic nationalism, had turned 
secular as it had freed intellectuals from 
what Adrian Marino calls “medieval 
mystical contemplation, of  devout, 
spiritual exercises,” and the new mindset 
instead becomes “profane and moral” 
with a more secular “social destination.”89 
Liberal ideology adopted from the French 
and German interpretations dominated 
Romanian political thought during this 
87. Seton-Watson, History of  the Roumanians, 209-214.
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the Earth,” forever cursed to a nationless 
state of  existence if  they did not awaken to 
the God-given opportunity that lay before 
them, namely the opportunity to shrug off  
the imperial slavery imposed upon them by 
the Austrians, Greeks, Magyars, Ottomans 
and Russians. This fear is grounded in the 
medieval myth of  the “Wandering Jew,” 
punished by God for the role they played in 
crucifying Christ, and forever doomed to 
“roam around the world like strangers.”103 
The Enlightenment had provided 
Romanians with the intellectual tools to 
fight their imperial oppressors and if  they 
did not, they risked being driven off  their 
ancestral land, just as the Jews had been 
driven from Palestine. By the middle of  
the nineteenth-century, Jews had become 
the objects of  shame and revulsion, as well 
as object lessons for what the Romanians 
could expect if  they did not seize the 
opportunity to realize nationhood.104 
Nevertheless, Jews had been “hostilely 
tolerated” for centuries, and during the 
first few decades of  the nineteenth-century, 
they seemed to be making some progress 
in obtaining civil rights and were even 
assimilating to some extent in some areas 
of  the Romanian-speaking lands.105 Even 
as the Réglements had banned Jews from 
owning property in the countryside and 
reinforced their exclusion from the political 
process, they did, however, express a small 
measure of  tolerance, as they allowed 
Jewish children to attend Romanian public 
schools. After the union of  the Principalities 
in 1859, though, as Jews from Galicia and 
the southern Russian provinces began 
settling in Moldavia, anti-Semitic rhetoric 
took on a new, more hateful, more paranoid 
and xenophobic character. 106
 Modernization and Anti-Semitism
Even though the political goals of  
the 1848 Romanian revolutionaries had 
not been realized, the momentum for 
Enlightenment aims of  “progress, truth, 
justice, morality.” The basis of  their disgust 
lay at the feet of  their fellow boyars who 
had aligned themselves with the Imperial 
Russian regime and used the Réglements as a 
means for personal enrichment rather than 
in service of  the national goal of  political 
sovereignty. They eventually formed, for 
the first time in Romanian history, an 
opposition party.
Before moving on to one of  the most 
critical phases of  Romanian history (the 
revolution of  1848), it is important to 
describe the Romanian perception of  the 
Jews in the Romanian-speaking regions. 
Anti-Semitism throughout Eastern Europe 
was commonplace, but each region or 
nation subscribed to its own version and 
was characterized differently. Romanian 
anti-Semitism can be traced to two sources. 
First, according to Andrei Oisteanu, 
“Orthodoxy does not contain ‘der Geist 
der Kapitalismus’’ and he goes on to quote 
Daniel Birbu who notes, “In the eyes of  
Orthodoxy, the sole legitimate occupation 
is one that takes caution before trespassing 
the boundaries of  natural economics. 
Roughly, it is only the peasant’s work that is 
acceptable to Orthodoxy.”101 Because local 
ordinances and customs often forbade him 
from owning land or property, Jews, then, 
often performed the role of  intermediary, 
merchant, banker, tavern-keeper, and all 
roles traditionally seen as verboten by the 
practitioners of  Orthodoxy; however, these 
services provided by these occupations are 
often seen as essential, even if  immoral. 
Lastly, the traditional Jewish occupations 
came to be seen as shameful, even as trade 
was considered to be a form of  robbery.102 
Sorin Mitu complicates and adds 
further depth to origins of  Romanian anti-
Semitism in the nineteenth-century with 
his assertion that Romanians feared that 
they, too, would be relegated to “wandering 
Courier, 1929-1848) and likewise proposed 
that “without national books, without a 
national literature, neither the patrie, nor 
patriotism, nor even nationality can exist.”96 
Râdalescu’s notation of  the importance 
of  literature in informing nationality 
comports well with Adrian Hasting’s same 
supposition written nearly 160 years later 
that a nation is primarily identified by the 
literature that it produces.97  
Both Asachi and Râdalescu’s 
publishing ventures came as a result of  
their awareness of  the backwardness of  
the Romanian-speaking lands and from 
a desire to promote Romanian national 
consciousness. Virtually every foreigner 
travelling through the Romanian-speaking 
lands lamented the backwardness of  the 
region and Romanian intellectuals were 
painfully aware of  the derision expressed 
in magazines as far away as London.98 
The publishers Asachi and Râdalescu who 
eventually became political leaders, were 
part of  the Romanian Enlightenment 
tradition. One principal of  the Romanian 
Enlightenment was that “literature must be 
directly and immediately useful to society” 
and whose “mission was to instruct and 
to criticize, to ‘enlighten’ in all aspects 
the consciousness of  the Roumanians.”99 
Pragmatism, then, was also one of  the 
most prominent features of  Romanian 
Enlightenment thought: if  an idea did not 
have a useful application, then it was of  no 
import. In a sense, literary Enlightenment 
fostered “national and social ideals (that) 
exceed in intensity and extent any other 
aim.”100 By the time of  the great European 
revolutions of  1848, countless privileged 
Romanian sons had travelled abroad and 
received excellent educations in Berlin, 
Paris, Rome and Vienna. They returned to 
their backward land full of  patriotic fervor 
and the vocabulary to express it. They 
were eager to contribute to the awakening 
of  their nation. They adopted the 
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in terms of  the state, meaning that the 
collective became more important than 
the individual. Constitutional reform 
in this sense, then, differed from that of  
its Western counterparts (who were also 
pursuing legal and historical redefinitions 
of  the state after 1848). Combined with 
the latent, and ever more vehement, 
anti-Semitism in the Romanian-speaking 
regions, and the declaration of  the primacy 
of  the collective rather than individual 
rights, Romanian nationalism took a more 
exclusivist turn.114 
The Transylvanian School attempted 
to define the geographical legitimacy of  
the Romanian national by elucidating the 
descent of  the Romanians from the Daco-
Romans. By doing so, they were locating 
Romanians on an “island of  Latinity in 
a Slav sea,” which called attention to the 
fact that Romanians had been subjected to 
foreign rule and oppression for centuries, 
hence the need to create a Romanian state 
that would protect them from future foreign 
invasion. The Romanian’s historical 
experience with foreign domination played 
a key role in forming a nation based on the 
primacy of  collectivism and exclusivity.115 
As subsequently noted, mass Jewish 
immigration from the east caused an uptick 
in Romanian anti-Semitism. Further 
adding fuel to the fire and occupying a 
place out of  proportion to the challenges 
facing the infant Romanian parliament was 
the naturalization debate, which focused on 
defining who belonged to the Romanian 
state and who was excluded from it.
After the Ausgleich (Compromise) of  
1867, the Hungarian aristocracy took 
control of  Transylvanian governmental 
affairs. Transylvania was subjected to 
relentless Magyarization and while 
Transylvanian Romanians resisted total 
assimilation into the Hungarian kingdom, 
advocacy for political autonomy was 
essentially repressed until after World 
War I, when Transylvania was awarded 
to Romania with the Treaty of  Triannon. 
effect of  alienating most of  Romanian 
society from the national project.110  
Further alienating society was the new 
government’s uneven handling of  the newly 
rationalized economy, which supported 
industrialist ventures through subsidies 
and tariffs, while at the same time ignoring 
the overwhelmingly agricultural sector of  
the economy. The commodification of  
land, an essential component of  breaking 
apart the feudal system and power of  
the boyars in the countryside, was hardly 
discussed. The refusal to address the 
medieval nature of  Romanian society lead 
one intellectual to declare that the new 
government was essentially one of  “forms 
without substance.”111 The new Romania 
had adopted many of  the liberal governing 
and market structures of  the West, but it 
had failed to reorder Romanian society in 
a way that reflected the new institutions. 
The failure of  the new government to 
address the plight of  the peasants and 
agriculturally based economy would set 
up a narrative of  marginalization and 
discontent in the first quarter of  the 
twentieth century. The refusal to rectify 
the disparate aristocratic living standards 
with the economic despair of  the peasants 
would be one of  the primary causes of  the 
rise of  fascism in the 1920’s.112 And lastly, 
while Jews would essentially be excluded 
from the political process, their presence 
was tolerated in the commercial market, 
as the skills and services that they offered 
were seen as essential to the prospects of  
the nascent Romanian economy.113 
Questions of  how to pursue social 
justice were pursued, with liberals 
advocating the enfranchisement of  the 
peasants and non-Christian ethnicities, 
such as the Jews, and with the conservatives 
representing the boyar interests, who 
fought tenaciously against the inclusion 
of  “foreign” ethnicities and land reform. 
Elites on both sides of  the debate about 
the future of  the Romanian state, 
however, defined the rights of  individuals 
emancipation from Russian domination 
increased. As a result, anti-Russian feeling 
also increased. Russia’s defeat in the 
Crimean War at the hands of  the British, 
French and Ottomans in 1856, paved 
the way for the union of  Moldavia and 
Wallachia and the United Principalities 
were born in 1859. Many viewed this as 
a first stepping stone to the creation of  a 
Greater Romania.107 Still widely influential, 
liberals of  “The Generation of  1848,” 
advocated Jewish emancipation, while 
their conservative compatriots, fearful of  
the contaminating effect of  “foreigners” 
on the Romanian modernization project, 
rejected this demand outright. It has been 
estimated that nearly half  of  the urban 
population in the United Principalities by 
this time was Jewish. Moldavia was also 
experiencing a massive influx of  Jews 
emigrating from the East due to increasing 
harsh treatment by the Poles, Russians, and 
Ukrainians. The massive immigration of  
Jews into the United Principalities caused 
a marked rise in anti-Semitism in a region 
already steeped in xenophobia.108  
The process of  modernization in 
the United Principalities rapidly gained 
momentum after 1866 with the adoption 
of  the new constitution, which can 
essentially be viewed as the blueprint for 
creating the future Romanian nation-
state. The constitutional debate was 
concentrated into two competing views, 
the liberal and the conservative. Inherent 
in the liberal and conservative debate 
was the question of  how to mobilize a 
backward region steeped in corruption, 
authoritarianism, and patriarchalism 
and that lacked capitalist and democratic 
traditions. Drawn up using the Belgian 
constitution of  1831 as a liberal reference 
point, the Romanian constitution set in 
place a highly centralized parliamentary 
democracy with the foreign monarch109 as 
its head. The beginnings of  mass politics 
were evident, even though only two parties 
were represented. Representation was 
based on landownership, which had the 
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Jewish tolerance within Romanian borders. 
On one hand, their business prowess was 
admired and deemed necessary for the 
creation of  a strong Romania, but on the 
other, the competition they represented 
caused resentment on the part of  those 
who wanted to see the Romanian economy 
grow and become strong due to Romanian 
business and economic savvy.
Exclusive Nationalism
In the later decades of  the nineteenth-
century Romanian intellectuals 
irrevocably split into two primary 
ideological camps, both of  which had 
divergent views concerning how the future 
Romania should be constructed. The 
liberal vision of  Romania was based upon 
Western concepts of  modernization: the 
implementation of  a market economy, 
the centralization of  power in a unified 
nation-state, the adoption of  a modern, 
liberal constitution, and the founding 
of  a parliamentary democracy (even 
though most Romanians were excluded 
from participating as they did not own 
land). The liberal vision was essentially 
“enlightened” in its outlook as it is firmly 
based on the faith they placed in progress 
and the importance of  the rationalization 
of  society. Acutely conscious of  Romania’s 
backwardness in comparison to the West, 
liberals thought of  the Romanian nation 
as a “liberating force, aimed against feudal 
society and foreign domination . . . and 
as composed of  native Romanians.”121 
As such, they sought to adopt economic, 
political and cultural structures based 
upon those found in the West, especially 
in France.
 The Europeanist view, as the liberal 
view was often called, came under 
heavy criticism by those representing 
its traditional, conservative counterpart 
because they were seen as too “emulative” 
and did not consider the unique character 
of  Romanian society. One prominent 
Romanian critique labeled the wholesale 
did not have a native population of  Jews. 
To Romanian leaders the Jews within 
its borders had only recently emigrated 
from Poland, Russia and Ukraine, and, 
therefore, did not qualify for Romanian 
citizenship.118 Romania leaders instead 
tried to characterize the exclusion of  Jews 
from civil society as a national imperative, 
for, if  Jews were to be granted full 
citizenship, the ethnic stock of  Romania 
would be jeopardized. This argument was 
really an extreme version of  Romantic 
nationalism’s insistence on the uniqueness 
of  every state and its inherent right to self-
determination.119  
While the Great Powers’ (France, 
Great Britain, the Ottoman Empire, 
Prussia, Russia) decisions at the Congress 
of  Berlin resulted in the formation of  a 
new Romanian state, in the opinion of  
Romanian leaders and those who were 
educated and interested enough to follow 
the debate, sovereignty had come with 
unacceptable costs. First, the intense 
lobbying of  Western Jews120 on behalf  
of  the Jewish brethren in Romania for 
the cause of  equal rights and citizenship 
reinforced the belief  that Jews were hostile 
to the national goals of  Romania. Due to 
the positions they often held as bankers 
and tavern keepers, many Romanian 
elites who had come to associate the 
Romanian peasantry with the essence 
of  “Romanianness” were alarmed that 
the Jews were attempting to destroy the 
purity of  the rural population. Secondly, 
Jews were seen as agents of  the West 
who were actively trying to undermine 
the goals of  creating an ethnically and 
culturally homogenous Romanian state. 
Romanian leaders and elites resented what 
they perceived to be Jewish and foreign 
intervention in Romanian internal affairs. 
Third, and also somewhat ambivalently, 
the Jewish occupation, and in some cases 
monopolization of  urban business activity, 
was both envied and resented. This led to 
the inconsistent position that many anti-
Semitic Romanian leaders took vis-à-vis 
Romanian anti-Semitism, though, 
flourished in Transylvania especially in 
the urban centers where Romanians found 
themselves in competition with the Jewish 
population. Anti-Semitism combined with 
economic tension created the conditions 
for Romanian nationalism to become 
more intensely inflamed, just as Gellner 
predicted it would. Adding fuel to the 
fire was the fact that Transylvanian Jews 
tended to have completely assimilated into 
the Hungarian section of  society and spoke 
Hungarian. Because Romanian nationalist 
leaders had long been associated with 
intellectuals of  the Uniate and Orthodox 
churches, the religious traditions of  the Jews 
offered one more means of  differentiating 
the Romanian, rural, Orthodox identity 
with that of  the Jewish urban identity.116   
In 1864 a revised Civil Code was issued 
which contained within it legislation that 
would permit, in theory, the naturalization 
of  ethnic minorities. In practice, though, 
most, and especially Jews, found it nearly 
impossible to acquire citizenship unless they 
could summon the necessary funds to pay 
for it. Most Jews, however, viewed this as a 
step in the right direction. The constitution 
of  1866 made Romanian intentions 
regarding naturalization even more clear, 
although not in the manner the Jews and 
other minorities had hoped for, as Article 
7 stated “Only foreigners of  Christian 
rites may obtain naturalization.”117 At 
the Congress of  Berlin of  1878 at which 
Romania’s fate regarding its declaration 
of  independence would be decided by 
the more powerful Western powers, the 
failure of  the Civil Code of  1864 and the 
inclusion of  Article 7 in the Constitution 
of  1866 would reinforce the suspicion that 
Romania was not serious, indeed, could 
not be serious due to the pervasive and 
entrenched nature of  anti-Semitism in the 
Principalities, about granting equal rights 
to all nationalities, regardless of  religious 
denomination, to those living within the 
Principalities. Indeed, by 1878, Romanian 
leaders had been declaring that Romania 
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to integrate the new minority populations 
that came along with newly acquired 
territories.125 Integration of  powerful, well-
educated urban minorities was one of  the 
primary challenges after the Great War and 
the fervency with which cultural policies 
were implemented to replace them, or at 
least diminish their influence, was fueled 
by intense nationalism, which in turn was 
fueled by the process of  modernization 
itself: the centralization of  government, 
bureaucratization (and especially that of  
the Ministry of  Education), the spread of  
mass politics (divergent ideologies, a plethora 
of  political parties, the enfranchisement 
of  male peasants), and the availability of  
government jobs.126  
Both before and after the Great War, 
Romania remained essentially rural; 
however, after the war, the newly acquired 
cities were overwhelmingly populated 
with Saxon-Germans, Hungarians, Slavs 
and Jews.127 Romanian leaders quickly 
realized the irredentist threat inherent in 
the new regions, populated as they were 
with powerful ethnic elites who were 
intent on maintaining their centuries 
old ruling privileges. According to Irina 
Livezeanu, these new, “large minorities 
were more urban, more schooled, and 
more modern than the Romanians.”128 
The old debate concerning the integration 
of  minorities into Romanian society and 
the guarantee of  civic rights and equality 
took on even greater importance as similar 
conditions were imposed on the interwar 
Romanian leadership by Western leaders 
inspired by Wilsonianism idealism and 
embedded in the Treaty of  Trianon. 
Romanian resentment seethed at yet one 
more perceived imposition on Romanian 
sovereignty. This time around Romanians 
were forced not only to recognize the 
equality of  the smaller groups of  ethnic 
minorities such as the Jews and Armenians, 
but now they were forced to recognize the 
equality and political legitimacy of  the 
associated with the negative consequences 
of  industrialization, urbanization, 
exploitation and the deterioration of  
traditional values in the peasantry who 
moved to the cities.  
Unfortunately, by the time of  
the Great Peasant Uprising of  1907, 
anti-Semitism, xenophobia and the 
promotion of  Christian Orthodox 
values were inextricably linked with 
Romanian populism and “Romanianness.” 
Expounded by urban intellectuals and 
circulated by the “village intellectuals,” 
anti-Semitic rhetoric masked the real 
economic problems of  the Romanian 
countryside, namely, that the issue of  
land reform had been ignored. Ironically, 
or perhaps cynically, the conservatives 
placed the peasant on a pedestal as a 
representation of  true “Romanianness” 
even as they pointedly ignored the fact that 
it was the conservative economic policy of  
promoting an agricultural policy without 
addressing the issue of  land reform that 
left the rural citizenry without the means 
to provide for itself. Conservatives often 
either represented the interests of  large 
landowners or were landowners themselves 
and had no interest in destroying their 
own economic livelihoods. Instead, 
conservatives deflected attention to their 
economic interests by inflaming anti-
Semitism and xenophobia to an already 
fevered pitch.124  
With the Treaty of  Trianon the 
Romanian dream of  a Greater Romania 
was realized. The addition of  Bessarabia 
Bukovina and Transylvania, though, 
engendered a set of  challenges that 
heightened the already exclusivist nature 
of  Romanian nationalism. Even as 
conservative critiques of  liberal efforts to 
modernize Romania based on Western 
cultural, economic and political structures 
firmly took root amongst Romanian society 
at large, both sides of  the political spectrum 
found themselves faced with the task of  how 
adoption of  Western liberal cultural, 
economic and political structures “forms 
without substance.”  Traditionalists viewed 
the rapid modernization of  Romania as 
harmful. Modernization needed to be 
slowed down so as to avoid destroying 
“the pure values of  the peasantry” and 
“in order to preserve essential Romanian 
traditions.”122 Also running counter to 
liberal conceptions of  how the Romanian 
economy should be industrialized, and 
thus modernized, was the conservative 
contention that the agrarian economy 
should receive primacy over the urban, 
industrial economy. Many conservative 
leaders worried about the negative aspects 
of  modernization (especially its corollaries, 
industrialization and capitalism) upon 
the peasantry.123 
One aspect of  the debate over 
Romanian national identity that both 
parties did agree upon was that the 
Romanian state should be independent, 
collectivist (the idea that state interests 
trump individual interests) and 
exclusionary. Related to the exclusionary 
character of  the state was the anti-Semitic 
rhetoric associated with all parts of  the 
ideological spectrum. From the long-held, 
Medieval anti-Semitism typical of  many 
European nations, from the arrival of  
Eastern Jews to Moldavia and Wallachia 
and their accompanying foreign culture, 
to the perceived influence of  foreign Jews 
in Romanian internal affairs, and now to 
the perceived outsized influence of  Jewish 
lease-holders and entrepreneurs in the 
Romanian countryside, Romanian anti-
Semitism became more virulent in direct 
correlation with each stage of  Romanian 
nationalism’s development. Jews had long 
been excluded from Romanian political 
affairs but had, nevertheless, successfully 
navigated the Romanian economy and 
provided essential services to Romanian 
society. The Jewish industrialists and 
capitalists, however, also became 
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villages. These same students who had left 
their villages for the city and the promise 
of  education turned to Codreanu’s Iron 
Guard where they found an outlet for their 
frustration that manifested in hatred and 
violence towards ‘foreign’ ethnic minorities 
who they believed had robbed them of  
their careers and dreams.136 
The student movement of  1922 
marked the beginning of  Romania’s 
modernization crisis, particularly the crisis 
that occurred in the bureaucratization of  
education which was itself  a manifestation 
of  the centralization of  power in Bucharest 
and its attendant focus on creating a 
Romanian elite to supplant powerful 
ethnic minorities in the newly acquired 
regions. Romanian intellectuals’ concerns 
about the number of  students receiving 
diplomas and the intense competition 
for jobs that the number of  newly 
graduated students that this competition 
engendered proved to be prophetic. By 
1922 student frustration reached a fever 
pitch.  Students accused the government 
of  selling out to the Western powers. As a 
result of  the Treaty of  Trianon after the 
Great War, the Western victors (primarily 
France and Great Britain), had forced the 
Romanian leadership to adopt legislation 
that guaranteed equality and citizenship 
to its Jewish population. Long-held 
Romanian resentment towards foreign 
interference in Romania’s internal affairs 
was reawakened and erupted into levels of  
outrage and fury not before experienced. 
Students stormed through city streets, 
harassing Jews and other minorities. They 
physically attacked Jews and destroyed 
Jewish shops and homes. The founder of  
Romania’s most powerful fascist party, 
the Legion of  the Archangel Michael 
(later to become the Iron Guard that for a 
short time before World War II governed 
Romania), Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, 
went so far as to murder a Jewish man. He 
was tried, but not convicted, even though 
all evidence pointed to his clear guilt. 
Indeed, he did not even attempt to hide his 
liberal and conservative interpretations 
of  “Romanianness,” but also challenged 
their teachers and nationalist mentors, 
thus introducing not only an ideological, 
but also a generational divide within the 
ever-expanding intelligentsia.134 It is in 
the interwar period that we finally see, 
many decades after the first appearance 
of  Romanian nationalism, a concerted, 
Gellnerian state attempt to create a 
homogenous culture through elementary 
and secondary schools and the universities 
that can be used as a framework for rural 
Romanians to supplant and combat the 
cultural dominance of  minority elites 
in the newly acquired cities.135 The 
interethnic conflict and competition in the 
cities often intensified and exacerbated 
nationalist tendencies, just as Gellner 
predicted, although, once again, this 
happened long after the first appearance 
of  Romanian nationalism.
By the early 1920’s, many Romanian 
educational leaders believed that the 
cultural revolution in education had 
reached crisis proportions. The number 
of  students with university diplomas far 
outnumbered the number of  positions 
available in the workforce. Not only was 
the quality of  the diploma questioned, but 
so also was the emphasis that universities 
had placed on educating students for 
careers in law and government service. 
Many educational leaders felt that students 
would better be able to pragmatically serve 
Romania by studying agriculture, biology, 
and chemistry, subjects that would have a 
more profound impact upon Romanian 
modernization. Instead, the universities 
produced students who upon graduation 
had little chance of  employment, 
which lead to even more widespread 
dissatisfaction and disillusionment. 
Some feared that the Romanian villages 
had suffered most by the Ministry of  
Education’s determination to educate its 
best and brightest. The brain drain from 
the countryside to the city was viewed as 
detrimental to the modernization of  the 
same powerful minorities (German-Saxons 
and Hungarians, primarily) who in the 
past refused to recognize similar Romanian 
demands and who now represented 
a potential threat to the unity of  
Greater Romania.129 
Romanian leaders attempted to 
displace the new minority elites by rapidly 
expanding educational opportunities 
both at the secondary and the university 
level to Romanians.130 Educational policy 
was facilitated by the centralization of  
authority in Bucharest, the capital of  
Romania, and dictated to each region the 
means by which consolidation should be 
achieved. Virtually all cultural policy was 
micro-managed from the capital, including 
even which textbooks should be used in 
the classroom. Massive bureaucracies 
were constructed to manage the cultural 
production of  “Romanianness” through 
government publications, secondary 
schools, the universities and the national 
theatres. Most Romanian university 
students came from the countryside and 
dreamt of  obtaining a degree that would 
provide access to what they believed were 
secured, cushy careers with the rapidly 
expanding Romanian bureaucracy.131 
They were sorely disappointed, however, 
upon arriving in the city and realizing that 
there was neither housing, nor room in 
the classroom. Further, when housing was 
available, it was not affordable. Classrooms 
often lacked scientific equipment, heat, and 
sometimes even professors.132 Romanian 
students believed that Jewish students 
occupied positions at the university that 
should have been reserved for Romanians. 
Anti-Semitism in the disillusioned student 
body, already indirectly encouraged by 
official national curricula that fostered 
a state-sponsored interpretation of  
Romanian identity, quickly ignited.133  
Ironically, the massive influx of  highly 
educated university graduates served 
as a further catalyst for the appearance 
of  fascism, as the student movement of  
1922 came to challenge not only the 
129.  Irina Livezeanu, Cultural Politic, 212. 
130.   Ibid.,235.
131.   Ibid., 242.
132.  Ibid., 237, 238.
133.   Ibid., 239.
134.   Ibid., 8. 
135.   Ibid., 262.
136.  Ibid., 242, 243.
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migration from the East in the 1860’s 
engendered fear that ‘foreigners’ were 
dramatically changing the ethnic make-
up of  the region and placing at risk the 
goal of  a future homogenous Romanian 
state. This fear combined with Romanian 
resentment towards foreign intervention 
in Romania’s internal affairs in the late 
1870’s. Anti-Semitic attitudes intensified. 
In both 1878 and 1919, Western powers 
advocated strongly on behalf  of  Jews in 
Romania and pressured Romania to adopt 
liberal naturalization policies and laws 
that guaranteed their equal treatment vis-
à-vis Romanians. Again, anti-Semitism 
ratcheted up yet another notch. In the 
interwar years, Romanian university 
students reacted against the perception that 
Jews were unfairly eating up educational 
resources that by right belonged to ethnic 
Romanians. This resentment combined 
with the fear of  socialism and Bolshevism, 
both of  which were supposedly being 
imported from Russian and propagated by 
Jews who wished to undermine the fledgling 
Romanian state. By the end of  the 1920’s, 
Romanian nationalism had devolved into 
exclusivity and defined Romania as a 
nation for certain Romanians only.
During the interwar years exclusive 
nationalism dominated the Romanian 
national discourse and defined the 
meaning of  Romanianness. Even though 
a wide range of  ideological positions 
were expounded in the media, the one 
commonality that they all shared was 
their anti-Semitism and xenophobia. Even 
the majority of  moderates and liberals 
subscribed to some form of  racism, however 
cloaked their utterances in reasonableness 
may have been. Xenophobia, racism, 
anti-Semitism and exclusive nationalism 
were strongly influenced by two primary 
factors. First, the Treaty of  Trianon 
created a significantly enlarged Romania 
with urban areas dominated primarily 
by powerful ethnic minorities. Irredentist 
fears inspired Romanian elites to displace 
these minorities by rapidly educating 
Romanians and sending them off  to the 
newly acquired territories to take over 
the cultural institutions run by the Saxons 
and Hungarians. This new group of  
Romanian elites had been inculcated in 
Transylvanian Diet. This document 
represented the culmination of  Romanian 
educational and political ambitions and 
the influence of  Enlightenment and 
Romantic thought on the political struggle 
for Romanian equality vis-à-vis the Three 
Nations in Transylvania. By the middle 
of  the nineteenth-century, Romanian 
national ambitions dominated elite and 
intellectual thought, which resulted 
in the first truly modern conceptions 
of  nationalism. Previously, Romanian 
nationalists had as their goal equality 
within the imperial governing structures 
within which they found themselves, but by 
1848, the quest for nationhood took on a 
full-blown urgency to achieve nationhood, 
eventually culminating in the founding 
of  the first sovereign, autonomous 
Romanian state in 1878. This era is one 
defined by patriotic nationalism. The 
culmination of  Romanian nationalism 
was defined by an intensification of  
nationalist rhetoric defined primarily by 
its exclusive nature and the debate about 
the course of  modernization that Romania 
should embark upon. As the pace of  
modernization sped up, manifested 
primarily by quickening urbanization, 
industrialization, centralization and 
bureaucratization, many Romanians 
were disillusioned by the character of  
modernization and eventually blamed 
its failures on urban ethnic minorities, 
especially the Jews.
As Romanian ethnic consciousness 
transformed to exclusive nationalism, 
Romanian conceptions of  minorities 
also changed. In the eighteenth century, 
there was an extreme version of  the 
Jewish minority, but their presence was 
tolerated due to the recognition that they 
provided essential economic services in 
the Romanian-speaking regions. As the 
revolutionaries of  1848 adopted more 
liberal social policies, so too did they 
adopt a more liberal stance towards Jewish 
naturalization laws. With the establishment 
of  the United Principalities of  Moldovia 
and Wallachia in 1859, the Jewish 
population was hopeful that they would no 
longer be merely tolerated, but accepted 
fully into political and social life. This 
was not to be, however, as massive Jewish 
guilt as he was well aware that a majority 
of  Romania supported his evil deed. 
The trial of  Codreanu added both to his 
personal prestige and heightened student 
participation in his Legionnaire movement. 
Not only did Romanian exclusive 
nationalism and fascism come about as 
a result of  the intense nation-building 
project directed from Bucharest, but the 
violence perpetrated against minorities 
during the interwar period, and especially 
against Jews, largely reflected Romanian 
society’s fears of  socialism and Bolshevism 
penetrating Romania. Jewish migration 
from Russia, Galicia, and the Ukraine 
fueled this fear, as they were thought 
to be Bolshevism’s ideological carriers. 
The Romanian fear of  Bolshevism 
also reflected the Romanian desire to 
create a nation with strictly Romanian 
characteristics, a concept somewhere 
between Western liberalism and Eastern 
paternalism. ‘Jewish Bolshevism’ was 
perceived as a threat to this goal and the 
disillusioned student population displayed 
the most exaggerated form of  this fear. 
It is in the student movements of  1922 
that Romanian nationalism transformed 
into fascism and that lead directly to 
Romania’s participation in the Holocaust 
of  World War II.137 
Conclusion
The origin of  Romanian nationalism 
can be placed firmly in the first half  of  the 
eighteenth-century and more specifically 
within the writings and activism of  the 
Uniate Priest Ion Innochentie Klein. 
Combined with peasant revolts in the 
countryside, Klein’s activism served to 
foster Romanian ethnic consciousness, 
the precursor to full-blown nationalism. 
By the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth-centuries, the Transylvanian 
school made strides towards creating a 
coherent Romanian history, Latinizing 
and ‘Romanianizing’ the language, 
writing the first Romanian grammars, 
and expounding the first Romanian 
national myths. The School’s supreme 
achievement, however, was the writing 
and presentation of  the Supplex Libellus 
Vallachorum to the Austrian Court and 
137.  Ibid., 246-248.
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than academically focused universities.
 In Imagined Communities Anderson 
posits the theory that nationalism’s origins 
can be found in the sixteenth-century with 
the advent of  print-capitalism. As the 
sacred languages used by the royal courts 
and church lose their primacy, people who 
can afford to buy books begin reading in 
their local vernaculars and publishers are 
more than happy to satisfy their demands. 
An expanding literate, urban middle-class 
largely fuels the publishing boom. As dated 
newspapers are published, people become 
more aware of  their ethnic brethren who 
might be located in the neighboring town 
or who might be located several hundred 
kilometers away. Either way they become 
aware of  one another and realize that 
they share the same culture and language. 
A sense of  ‘imagined community’ is thus 
created through a common language 
propagated through books and newspapers. 
Eventually, ethnic awareness fosters a more 
concrete idea of  nation, which in turn 
spurs the movement for nationhood.
 Anderson’s theory does not fit 
the Romanian case, however, for several 
reasons. The first reason is that Romania’s 
rural inhabitants remained cut off  from 
the rest of  the Romanian-speaking 
regions. Even by the interwar period many 
Romanians in the countryside lived an 
essentially medieval existence. Romania 
remained primarily rural until well in 
to the 1960’s. Even at the turn of  the 
twentieth-century it is estimated that only 
ten percent of  the Romanian population 
was literate. Capitalism did not reach 
Romania until after the founding of  the 
first Romanian state in the late 1870’s 
and a middle class did not begin to form 
to any significant degree until the first 
decade of  the twentieth century (and 
when it did begin to grow during the late 
interwar years, its development was nipped 
in the bud after the communist takeover in 
1947). All of  Anderson’s ingredients for 
the nationalist recipe, then, are missing in 
Romania. Romanian nationalism seems 
to have been promoted by and subscribed 
to by a relatively small number of  elites 
in academia, business, government and 
perhaps by the petite bourgeoisie and other 
groups who were literate such as priests 
and teachers. The exact mechanisms by 
which nationalist ideology filtered down to 
fact that it was too successful. By educating 
so many so quickly, it created a large 
population of  well-educated students who 
had virtually no prospect of  ever utilizing 
its education due to a lack of  opportunity 
in the job market. Competition for scarce 
jobs and resentment towards ethnic 
minorities for competing for those jobs 
created the conditions for scapegoating, 
which inevitably fell upon the usual target, 
the Jews. The student uprisings of  1922 
resulted in violent protest directed towards 
the Jewish population and culminated in 
the formation of  Codreanu’s Legion of  the 
Archangel Michael, a fascist organization 
the quickly gained in popularity and 
eventually came to power in the late 1930’s. 
 In Nations and Nationalism Gellner 
wrote that in order for nationalism to 
occur, a nation must experience the split 
from agricultural, medieval society to 
one defined by industrialization. In the 
Romanian case, however, nationalism 
made its appearance more than a 
century before industrialization made its 
appearance in Romania. While Gellner 
does not make distinctions between 
patriotic and exclusive nationalism as I 
have done, even if  the brand of  nationalism 
that Gellner was writing about was defined 
as exclusive (which made its appearance 
in the later half  of  the nineteenth-century 
in Romania), Romania would not embark 
on massive industrialization until after 
World War II. Similarly, urbanization, 
the corollary of  industrialization, did not 
occur on a massive scale until after World 
War II, and even by the 1960’s, more than 
40% of  the Romanian population still 
lived in the countryside. Gellner insists that 
the homogenization of  culture required by 
an industrial society relies upon wide scale 
literacy, which also functions to support 
industry. In Romania, however, the push 
for literacy was due first to the recognition 
of  the backwardness of  the Romanian 
people in relation to its Western neighbors. 
The Romanians also had as their goal 
the desire to displace the powerful ethnic 
minority elites in the newly-acquired cities. 
The goal of  creating a homogenous culture 
that aligned with the goals of  industry 
seemed to have been rarely discussed; 
indeed, if  they had been, the crisis of  
modernity in education might not have 
occurred, as more students would have 
been directed to vocational schools rather 
both secondary schools and the universities 
with a strong sense of  Romanian national 
identity that was underwritten by a 
subscription to the Romanian nationalist 
ideology and its corollaries, xenophobia 
and anti-Semitism.   
The second factor that heightened 
racism and nationalism in Romania during 
the interwar period was the perception 
that Romanian modernization had gone 
awry. As peasants flocked to the city to find 
employment, they found that it was not 
the paradise or land of  opportunity that 
they believed it was. As industrialization 
had hardly taken off, there were very few 
jobs. The cities were filthy and often lacked 
basic sanitation structures. The deeply 
religious country folk collided with what 
they believed was the decadent lifestyles 
of  the city dwellers. Even though much of  
the destitution found in the city was due 
to effects of  the Great War on Romanian 
society in general and the severe economic 
malaise of  the first years after the war, 
many who moved to the cities associated 
the filth, loose morals, and competition 
with foreigners, most notably the Jews, 
who were supposedly transplanting the 
decadent lifestyle of  the West into ‘pure’ 
Romania in an attempt to destroy it. 
The failures of  industrialization and 
urbanization, then, were associated with 
anti-Semitism and xenophobia.
Modernization also failed by 
succeeding. The tight coordination of  
cultural policy by the central authorities 
in Bucharest fervently promoted education 
during the first two decades of  the 
twentieth-century. Even though many 
schools often lacked basic supplies such as 
books and benches, Romanian literacy in 
these first two decades sharply increased. 
But the Education of  Ministry’s major 
success was to be found in the number of  
university students it successfully enrolled 
and sponsored. The push to provide 
Romanians with a university education 
was inspired both by the realization of  
the backwardness of  the Romanian 
rural population in comparison to the 
Western nations, but also, as noted above, 
by the goal of  creating a class of  ethnic 
Romanian elites to displace the powerful 
and more educated ethnic minorities in the 
newly acquired territories. The irony of  
the Ministry’s success, though, lies in the 
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the masses is not clear to me and, indeed, 
an investigation into how ideas in general 
flow from cultural elites to the uneducated, 
working poor would be a fascinating topic 
to take on. Indeed, the lack of  clarity of  
just how this process works in Anderson’s 
theory of  imagined communities appears 
to be one of  this book’s shortcomings. 
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